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BOOK REVIEW 
CRAFTING PRECEDENT 
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT.  By Bryan A. Garner et al.   
St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson Reuters.  2016.  Pp. xxvi, 910.  $49.95. 
Reviewed by Paul J. Watford, Richard C. Chen, 
and Marco Basile 
How does the law of judicial precedent work in practice?  That is 
the question at the heart of The Law of Judicial Precedent, the first 
treatise on the subject in more than 100 years.  The treatise sets aside 
more theoretical and familiar questions about whether and why earlier 
decisions (especially wrong ones) should bind courts in new cases.1  In-
stead, it offers an exhaustive how-to guide for practicing lawyers and 
judges: how to identify relevant precedents, how to weigh them, and 
how to interpret them.  In short, how to apply precedents to new cases. 
The treatise’s thirteen authors include representatives from several 
of the federal circuit courts, justices from two state supreme courts, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s newest member, Justice Neil Gorsuch.2  Their 
coauthor and the project’s fountainhead, Bryan Garner, is the editor of 
Black’s Law Dictionary and one of the country’s leading authorities on 
legal writing and reasoning.3  The treatise is not a compendium of chap-
ters written separately by these authors and loosely tied to a common 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
  Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; Law Clerk to the Honorable 
Paul J. Watford, 2012–2013. 
  Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul J. Watford, 2016–2017.  In many chambers, judges work 
closely with their law clerks to resolve cases and draft opinions.  In preparing this Review, we drew 
on our experiences working together in chambers and took a similarly collaborative approach to 
this project.  (Admittedly, three authors for a book review may be excessive, but it seems only fair 
given our task of reviewing a work by thirteen authors.)  For helpful comments and suggestions, 
we are grateful to Michael Evans, Michael Klarman, Randy Kozel, Eric Nguyen, John Rappaport, 
Alice Wang, and Esther Yoo, as well as to participants in a faculty workshop at the University of 
Maine School of Law.  
 1 See infra section I.A, pp. 545–49.  
 2 The judicial authors are Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit, Rebecca White Berch of the  
Supreme Court of Arizona, Neil M. Gorsuch of the U.S. Supreme Court, Harris L Hartz of the 
Tenth Circuit, Nathan L. Hecht of the Supreme Court of Texas, Brett M. Kavanaugh of the D.C. 
Circuit, Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, Sandra L. Lynch of the First Circuit, William H. Pryor 
Jr. of the Eleventh Circuit, Thomas M. Reavley of the Fifth Circuit, Jeffrey S. Sutton of the Sixth 
Circuit, and Diane P. Wood of the Seventh Circuit. 
 3 In addition to various style and usage manuals, he coauthored two books with Justice Antonin 
Scalia.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PER-
SUADING JUDGES (2008); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE IN-
TERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) [hereinafter SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW]. 
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theme.  Rather, the authors worked together on the entire treatise to 
speak with one voice in an effort to bring unprecedented cohesion to the 
law of judicial precedent. 
That undertaking involved assembling the principles that govern the 
application of federal, state, international, and foreign precedents in 
American courts.  Because no one has done that since 1912 (p. xiii),4 the 
project required research across a vast number of cases and authorities 
that had not previously been brought together.  The result is a distilla-
tion of ninety-three “blackletter” principles of judicial precedent (pp. xv–
xxvi).  For example, the first principle: “Like cases should be decided 
alike.”   
This Review takes up the treatise on its own terms as a practice guide 
for working lawyers and judges (p. 18).  Our initial aim is to identify 
how the treatise can be useful to lawyers and judges by describing its 
scope and drawing out some of its more salient lessons.  Accordingly, in 
Part I, we provide a roadmap of the types of problems that the treatise 
addresses and the principles that it identifies for resolving them.  Fol-
lowing the treatise’s lead, our discussion explores what types of prece-
dents bind which courts and how much weight they should be given.  
To evaluate the treatise’s contribution on that score, we first situate the 
treatise in the context of the existing literature on precedent and identify 
some possible limitations inherent in the treatise’s project.  In particular, 
it is fair to wonder whether and to what extent our system of precedent, 
consisting largely of modes of reasoning, can be codified into blackletter 
rules. 
In Part II, we home in on the distinct challenge of interpreting pre-
cedent, for which the guiding principles are least susceptible to articu-
lation as blackletter rules.  Although the treatise focuses on the reader’s 
task of interpreting an earlier decision, it also reveals how interpretation 
is really a “dialogue between courts” (p. 73).  That is, a future court 
ultimately decides what an earlier decision means, but the authoring 
court can facilitate that task by clarifying its decision’s reasoning and 
scope. 
We see this central insight as an opening to flip the treatise’s per-
spective and ask how the treatise’s insights on the interpretation of pre-
cedent can inform the writing of opinions that become precedents.  
Knowing the challenges future readers will face in reading and applying 
a case as precedent, what can the judges do at the front end of the pro-
cess to craft more effective precedent?5  Part II is organized according 
to three key steps in the opinion-writing process: refining the question 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 
OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW (1912). 
 5 Professor Jeremy Waldron engages in a similar inquiry, though his is more philosophical in 
nature.  His article explores the respective roles of authoring and interpreting courts in using stare 
decisis to promote the rule of law.  See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A 
Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
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presented, identifying the governing law, and describing the material 
facts.  At each step, we translate the guidance that the treatise provides 
for the interpretation process into lessons for authoring courts to con-
sider at the drafting stage. 
We hope the lessons on writing precedent will be useful not only to 
judges and their law clerks but also to advocates.  After all, identifying 
what judges can do to write more effective precedent also sheds light on 
how advocates can be more helpful in the way they frame the case for 
the court. 
I.  PRECEDENT IN PRACTICE 
A.  From “Why” to “How”: A Science of Caselaw? 
Perhaps the best way to introduce The Law of Judicial Precedent is 
to point out what it is not: a study of whether precedent should bind 
judicial decisionmaking and the reasons why or why not.  That is telling 
because much scholarship on precedent has traditionally been interested 
in the question of why earlier decisions bind judges’ subsequent deci-
sions (and whether they should at all).  To appreciate the treatise’s con-
tribution, that question merits some preliminary attention.  
Why do American courts defer to precedent?  One answer empha-
sizes fairness.  The idea is that similar cases ought to come out the same 
way; outcomes shouldn’t arbitrarily turn on who the decisionmaker is.  
Scholars also invoke a set of practical reasons justifying the doctrine of 
binding precedent (pp. 9–12).  For example, the doctrine ensures that 
judicial outcomes are more predictable so that people can figure out 
what the law is and plan their lives accordingly.  Following precedent 
also helps conserve judicial resources given that it relieves courts from 
having to decide the legal questions in every case anew.6 
But those benefits come at a cost.  Being bound by earlier decisions 
means occasionally being bound by wrong decisions, too.  The treatise’s 
recurring example of that risk is the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision 
holding that major league baseball does not involve “interstate com-
merce” and is therefore beyond the scope of federal antitrust legislation 
(pp. 4, 100, 335–36).7  As controversial as that precedent strikes the trea-
tise’s authors, it nevertheless continues to bind the courts almost a cen-
tury after it was decided.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 On the practical justifications for precedent, see Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. 
L. REV. 367, 368–72 (1988); and Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597–602 
(1987).  Not all defenses of precedent, of course, rest on practical grounds.  See, e.g., Anthony T. 
Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1066 (1990) (defending adherence to pre-
cedent on the ground that tradition “makes us who we are” by facilitating the development of hu-
man culture). 
 7 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
  
546 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:543 
More recent scholarly attention to precedent concerns less the prac-
tical reasons for and against the doctrine of binding precedent and more 
the source and scope of its legal basis.  Despite the central role precedent 
plays in our legal system, the Constitution nowhere mentions it.  Is the 
binding nature of precedent a constitutional mandate, enshrined as part 
of the “judicial Power” in Article III, or a mere “judicial policy” that 
Congress might even be able to override by statute (pp. 6–7)?8  With 
respect to constitutional decisions, scholarly disagreement over how 
strong the binding nature of precedent should be often reflects broader 
differences in approaches to constitutional interpretation.9  For example, 
scholars who privilege the constitutional text and original understanding 
of that text might be more skeptical of precedent when an earlier deci-
sion conflicts with the best reading of the text and its original meaning.10  
By contrast, proponents of the view that the Constitution takes on 
meaning only through the process of interpreting the text over time tend 
to embrace stronger theories of precedent.11 
The Law of Judicial Precedent arrives against this scholarly 
backdrop with an altogether different mission.  It seeks to provide “a 
conventional description of contemporary practice useful to the working 
lawyer and judge” (p. 18).  For judges like the ones who coauthored the 
treatise and for the lawyers who appear before them, it is axiomatic that 
precedent binds their work.  The question then is how does precedent 
operate in practice?  Surprisingly, very little scholarship before this 
treatise has probed that question systematically, and none in such 
granular detail, despite its enormous practical importance.12 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 The treatise compares THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton  
Rossiter ed., 2003), with Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).  For a defense of the constitu-
tional stature of stare decisis and a discussion of the issue’s implications, see generally Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Essay, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001). 
 9 See Kurt T. Lash, Essay, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Pre-
cedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005). 
 10 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as 
It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258–59 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and 
the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 312–13 (2005); Gary Lawson, 
The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27–28 (1994); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect 
of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538 (2000).  But see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 803–04 (2009); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 271, 272–74 (2005); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011). 
 11 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional 
Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 70–73 (1988); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879, 926–27 (1996). 
 12 There are limited exceptions.  See RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW 
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The authors describe The Law of Judicial Precedent as a “hornbook” 
containing ninety-three “blackletter” principles that govern when and to 
what extent an earlier decision is precedential (p. xiii).  The volume seeks 
to revive a tradition from the turn of the twentieth century of hornbooks 
that treated precedent as a topic capable of systematic study (p. xiii) — 
as a “science of caselaw” in the words of one of those hornbooks.13  Thus, 
to the extent that The Law of Judicial Precedent can be said to have a 
thesis, it is that the law of judicial precedent can be coherently organized 
according to governing principles.   
The project to codify the law of judicial precedent might initially 
provoke some skepticism.  To begin with, principles of precedent often 
seem more like modes of reasoning rather than firm rules.  Modes of 
reasoning generally require an exercise of discretion to determine the 
appropriate course of action, whereas that is less often true with firm 
rules.14  For example, Principle #7 tells us that “[f]or one decision to be 
precedent for another, the facts in the two cases need not be identical.  
But they must be substantially similar, without material difference” 
(p. 92).  That principle is undoubtedly correct.  But, as the authors 
acknowledge, the principle cannot be applied mechanically like a rule.  
Rather, the principle merely invites a particular mode of analogical rea-
soning, which involves identifying the relevant points of comparison and 
the relevant level of generality for the comparison.15  In this way, from 
the perspective of guiding courts toward a course of action, there are 
limits to the utility of offering principles of precedent as blackletter rules. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
METHOD (1997) (offering “an account of how American judges . . . create, interpret and apply 
precedents,” id. at 3); RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 
(2017) (discussing, among other things, the interpretive problem of identifying a precedent’s scope 
and the challenge of weighing a precedent’s strength); INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS (D. Neil 
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (comparing how precedent works among various 
countries).  There is a more substantial literature on the specific problem of distinguishing holdings 
from dicta.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
953 (2005).  Of course, scholars engage in extensive discussions about the interpretation of precedent 
in particular domains; it’s the more systematic analyses of the practice of precedent in general that 
are less common than one might expect. 
 13 BLACK, supra note 4, at vi; see also EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (3d ed. 
1909).  The Law of Judicial Precedent is particularly indebted to Henry Campbell Black’s Hand-
book on the Law of Judicial Precedents.  The newer treatise adopts the basic structure and scope of 
the older treatise.  It’s unclear why earlier efforts to treat the law of judicial precedent systematically 
were not picked up again until now.  The rise of legal realism and increased skepticism of legal 
formalism in the first half of the twentieth century may have undermined the perceived coherence 
of Black’s project, for the reasons we discuss below.  Cf. generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960 (1992). 
 14 In this way, we are referring to “rules” in the sense of firm rules of decision, as opposed to 
discretion-conferring standards.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (1989). 
 15 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743–
49 (1993). 
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More broadly, the very effort to codify blackletter rules of precedent 
might imply an unrealistic view of judging in which answers about how 
to interpret and apply precedent can be looked up and rotely applied to 
the case at hand.  In this regard, Judge Richard Posner forcefully cri-
tiqued another effort by Bryan Garner and coauthor Justice Antonin 
Scalia — in their handbook Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts — to systematize the law in an area that similarly resists codifica-
tion.16  Judge Posner is a leading proponent of the view that judges do 
not and cannot decide cases through the mechanical application of rules, 
that the exercise of discretion is inevitable, and that the legal system 
would be better served if judges engaged in such reasoning more 
openly.17  He therefore took exception to Reading Law for what he con-
sidered to be its unrealistic “passive view of the judicial role” and its 
deceptive claims that textual originalism provides an “‘objective’ inter-
pretive methodology.”18  Analogously, if the interpretation and applica-
tion of precedent is a messier process requiring discretion, then a judge’s 
purported reliance on blackletter rules to determine the scope and 
weight of a given precedent might mask the full set of judgments actu-
ally entailed in that process. 
We think any initial skepticism about the treatise’s project to sys-
tematize the law of precedent will prove largely unfounded.  On its own 
terms, the treatise is frankly uninterested in settling the longstanding 
debate between legal realists and formalists over the extent to which 
precedent constrains judging.  The former emphasize the exercise of dis-
cretion involved in applying precedent, characterizing it as a “work-
bench of tools” for achieving particular results, while the latter view 
precedents as much more rule-like, in the sense that they can be applied 
mechanically.19 
The authors do (rightly) reject the extreme realist view that judicial 
reliance on precedent merely reflects policy preferences — a position 
they describe as the “cynical” view of judging (pp. 74–75).  But they 
never go so far to the other extreme as to suggest that most past decisions 
can be translated into rules and applied mechanically.  Instead, their 
project merely treats many of the principles governing the use of prece-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 3; Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence 
of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-
garner-readingthelaw-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/C6JT-TQ9T]. 
 17 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9–13 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Prag-
matic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4–8 (1996). 
 18 Posner, supra note 16. 
 19 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 91 (1960).  
Compare, e.g., id., and BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
142–80 (1921), with Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17–19, 25–
27 (1989).   
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dent as rules.  And even then, the treatise is transparent about the prin-
ciples that cannot be readily reduced to firm rules and for which it can 
offer only general guidance and illustrations.  In this way, the authors’ 
description of the principles as “blackletter” means simply that they are 
“well settled,”20 without the connotation of a firm legal rule that the 
term sometimes has. 
The authors thus envision judges as engaged in a collective project 
to develop and elucidate the law in which principles for interpreting and 
applying precedent do in fact constrain their work, even if discretion 
must sometimes be exercised to implement those principles.  “[M]ost 
judges who serve in our system of justice,” the treatise attests, “sincerely 
believe that they are following rules that constrain them — and earnestly 
seek to follow these rules” (p. 75).  Our own discussion of writing pre-
cedent in Part II is undertaken in the same spirit.  After all, if we did 
not think that later courts would attempt to construe precedent faith-
fully, there would be little reason for us to encourage authoring courts 
to work to clarify the scope and reasoning of their decisions — that is, 
to treat writing precedent as a craft. 
B.  The Problems and Principles of Precedent 
The main contribution of The Law of Judicial Precedent is identify-
ing and assembling in one volume the various problems and questions 
of precedent that practicing lawyers and judges might encounter, as well 
as guiding principles for resolving them.  The principles themselves are 
not novel.  (Nor, with some exceptions, are they so well established as 
to be irrefutable.)  But that is not what we ask of law treatises, which 
generally seek instead to organize and clarify an area of law for the sake 
of reference.  In that vein, The Law of Judicial Precedent provides a 
framework for organizing the principles of precedent while also but-
tressing their salience. 
The authors distill what they aptly call the “dizzying matrix of doc-
trines and subdoctrines” governing precedent to ninety-three principles, 
each of which is discussed in detail (p. 781).  The principles are divided 
into nine sections: “The Nature and Authority of Judicial Precedents,” 
“Weight of Decisions,” “Some Practicalities of Stare Decisis,” “The Law 
of the Case,” “Federal Doctrine and Practice,” “State Law in Federal 
Court,” “State-Law Doctrine and Practice,” “Foreign Precedents,” and 
“Arbitrations.”  For quick reference, the treatise includes an annotated 
table of contents that lists all of the principles (pp. xv–xxvi) and a glos-
sary of key terms (pp. 785–809). 
The treatise defines “precedent” in two ways: 
1. Something of the same type that has occurred or existed before.  2. An 
action or official decision that can be used as support for later actions or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 Blackletter Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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decisions; esp., a decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later 
cases involving similar facts or issues.  (p. 801) 
The treatise primarily has in mind the latter clause of the second defi-
nition, and it thus mostly discusses earlier judicial decisions (see pp. 22, 
24).  But in keeping with the broader definition of precedent, the treatise 
also occasionally considers nonjudicial decisions by executive actors, leg-
islative bodies, and arbitrators.  Whatever the type of precedent consid-
ered, the treatise does so almost exclusively from the perspective of fed-
eral and state courts in the United States. 
The Law of Judicial Precedent can be consulted much like a treatise 
on, say, the rules of evidence or federal jurisdiction.  In many instances, 
readers will find a relatively clear answer to whatever question is at 
hand.  For example, suppose you’re working on a legal issue for which 
there are two controlling yet irreconcilable earlier decisions of equal au-
thority.  Which do you follow?  Principle #36 provides an answer.  If 
your case is in a lower court and the jurisdiction’s high court issued the 
two earlier decisions, the treatise tells us, the more recent decision gen-
erally controls.  However, if the case is before an intermediate appellate 
court and the two earlier decisions are that court’s own precedent, then 
the earlier case generally controls.21  Where answers to questions can be 
guided only by fuzzier general principles — such as the factors that bear 
on whether a higher court should overrule its own precedent (Principles 
#47 and #48) — the treatise illustrates the principle through examples 
and collects competing approaches by different courts.  The treatise is 
also a resource for identifying unresolved issues — for example, whether 
federal district court decisions are binding on bankruptcy courts (pp. 
515–16). 
Below, we offer a roadmap of the themes and questions for which 
lawyers and judges might consult the treatise.  Our discussion incorpo-
rates the treatise’s own topical section divisions, but it primarily tracks 
the central problems at the core of the treatise that lawyers and judges 
encounter while working with precedent.  In a given case, lawyers and 
judges must first identify the possible universe of decisions issued by the 
court or other courts that might have precedential value in the case.  
Then they must determine the weight that the court should afford to 
each precedent.  Taken together, the scope of the treatise’s central in-
quiry is therefore “what precedents have binding power, and how far 
they have it” (p. 19).22 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 In such circumstances, lower courts generally assume that the high court overruled itself, if 
not explicitly then tacitly.  Intermediate appellate courts, by contrast, follow the “‘general rule’ that 
‘one panel may not overrule the decision of a prior panel’” and therefore resolve conflicts in favor 
of earlier decisions (pp. 303–04) (quoting Billiot v. Puckett, 135 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1998)).  There 
are exceptions to the rules in both scenarios (pp. 301–05). 
 22 The treatise quotes FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 192  
(William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880). 
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1.  “What Precedents Have Binding Power.” — The threshold prob-
lem encountered in working with precedent is identifying the universe 
of earlier decisions that are binding on the court.  The answer depends 
on the identity of the interpreting court and the source of the earlier 
decision.  Roughly the second half of the treatise explores this issue, 
including the sections on the law of the case, federalism, foreign prece-
dents, and arbitration. 
At the most intimate scale of a court considering its own earlier de-
cisions within the same litigation, the law of the case doctrine dictates 
when those earlier decisions govern later stages of the dispute (Principle 
#52).  The treatise sets out the basic parameters of the doctrine — 
namely, that the earlier decision governs only if it was a final decision 
that was necessary to resolve the dispute (Principles #53 and #54).  The 
treatise also identifies the circumstances in which an earlier decision 
may nevertheless be reconsidered, such as when a material fact or con-
trolling legal authority changes (Principle #59).  The treatise pays special 
attention to complications introduced by appeals.  Under the mandate 
rule, any decision made on appeal binds the lower court on remand 
(Principle #55), and the scope of subsequent appeals is limited to ques-
tions not determined or waived in the earlier appeal (Principle #56).  
Doctrinal wrinkles for which the treatise might be consulted include 
whether a jurisdictional issue decided in an earlier appeal is the law of 
the case in a subsequent appeal (yes) and whether the law of a case 
dismissed without prejudice governs a subsequent action based on a 
substantially similar complaint (unclear) (pp. 469–71).  
At the broader scale of our federal system, principles of federalism 
govern when federal and state courts are bound by earlier federal and 
state decisions. 
The federal courts follow only federal precedents on questions of fed-
eral law, international law, and maritime law, as well as issues related 
to the scope of their jurisdiction (Principles #64, #65, #67, and #69).  That 
said, they occasionally borrow state rules to supplement federal common 
law and maritime law (Principles #66 and #69).  District courts are 
bound by decisions of federal law by the courts of appeals in their re-
spective circuits (Principle #60), and neither district courts nor courts of 
appeals are bound by other courts of equal rank (Principle #62).23     
Federal courts otherwise follow state precedents on substantive state 
law in both diversity and federal question cases (Principles #70 and #75).  
In practice, that means that a federal court adjudicating a state law issue 
follows the decisions of the state’s highest court.  In the absence of a 
controlling decision, the federal court predicts how the high court would 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 An exception is that a newly formed court of appeals may bind itself to the decisions of the 
court that previously exercised its jurisdiction.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit binds itself to the 
decisions of the Fifth Circuit predating its split from that circuit, whereas the Tenth Circuit does 
not do so with respect to the Eighth Circuit’s decisions predating their own split (pp. 513–14). 
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rule on the issue as if the federal court were a lower state court (Principle 
#73).  The treatise also provides guidance on determining which state’s 
law governs in diversity cases (Principle #72), as well as on the process 
for certifying questions to a state high court (Principle #74).      
In turn, state courts follow their own high courts on state law ques-
tions and the U.S. Supreme Court on federal questions and when state 
law is preempted by federal law (Principles #77, #79, and #81).  When a 
state court must resolve a question governed by the law of another state, 
the other state’s precedents are binding (Principle #84).  But if a state 
borrows a statute from another state, the other state’s precedents inter-
preting that statute are merely persuasive authority (Principle #85).  
Principles of uniformity and comity also guide interstate judicial rela-
tions.  A state high court facing a novel question of state law should 
generally aim for uniformity with the other states if there is a trend 
toward unanimity on the point, although the court is not bound to do so 
(Principle #83).  And even though a state court decides for itself whether 
another state’s law is penal in nature, and hence unenforceable in other 
states, it might nevertheless enforce the law as a matter of comity (Prin-
ciple #87).24  
At the global scale beyond our federal system, a lawyer or judge may 
need to determine what weight to give to earlier decisions by foreign 
and international tribunals.  The treatise indicates that a foreign deci-
sion is not precedential in American courts unless the parties’ rights turn 
on a question of foreign law and the foreign country’s own courts treat 
the decision as precedential (Principle #90).  As for international law, 
earlier decisions by international tribunals are not binding on American 
courts or even on the tribunals themselves (Principle #91).  (In practice, 
however, international tribunals tend to treat their past decisions as ef-
fectively controlling (pp. 763–65).) 
Finally, the treatise briefly looks at arbitration, which occurs outside 
the scope of judicial decisionmaking considered above.  In arbitration, 
earlier decisions by courts or other arbitrators have no formal preceden-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 In the more granular detail of the treatise, readers will find all sorts of diversity in how states 
deal with judicial precedent.  For example, lawyers might not often think to consider the preceden-
tial stature of the syllabus summarizing a decision at the beginning of a reported decision.  But it 
turns out that syllabi for decisions by the state’s highest court are considered binding precedent in 
Kansas, Ohio, West Virginia, and Minnesota (pp. 151–52).  In fact, only legal points included in the 
syllabus are binding in Ohio (p. 152).  Or consider the Texas Supreme Court’s distinction between 
“refusing” to review a lower court’s decision and “denying” review.  Denying review indicates noth-
ing about the merits of the lower court’s decision, as is generally true when a higher court declines 
to review a case.  But “refusing” review gives the lower court’s decision the same precedential value 
as if the Texas Supreme Court had issued it (p. 263).  In California, a decision of the intermediate 
appellate court automatically has the precedential value of a decision by a court of last resort until 
and unless the state’s supreme court disavows it (and provided there is no conflict among the deci-
sions of the intermediate court) (p. 307). 
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tial effect (Principles #92 and #93).  The treatise’s discussion of arbitra-
tion may prompt readers to compare the principles of contract that gov-
ern arbitration, in which the parties set the rules for what will bind the 
arbitrator’s decision, with the system of precedent described over the 
several hundred preceding pages.   
The treatise’s observation that many fields of arbitration have none-
theless developed their own de facto practices of precedent (pp. 774–78), 
as is true with international tribunals, raises the question whether pre-
cedent could ever really be abandoned in any iterative decisionmaking 
process.25  In a sense, then, the discussion of arbitration provokes the 
broader “why” question that the treatise sets aside as beyond its pur-
view: To what extent is a system of precedent desirable, and is it in fact 
constitutive of judicial power? 
2.  “How Far They Have It.” — Once a precedent is identified as 
either binding or persuasive authority according to the principles dis-
cussed in the preceding section, a second challenge arises.  At that point, 
a lawyer or judge must determine the weight that the precedent should 
be given in resolving the case at hand.  Much of the first half of the 
treatise, including the sections “Weight of Decisions” and “Some Practi-
calities of Stare Decisis,” focuses on that challenge. 
Of course, how far a precedent governs a given case depends in large 
part on whether the precedent is binding.  If a decision is not binding, 
then a court will follow it only to the extent that the court finds the 
decision persuasive (Principle #16).  If a precedent is binding, however, 
it usually but not always means just that (Principle #15): “Lower courts 
must strictly follow . . . decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdic-
tion” (p. 27).  That rule also applies to a three-judge intermediate appel-
late panel with respect to that court’s en banc decisions (p. 37).  But 
higher courts, including intermediate appellate courts sitting en banc, 
are bound by their own decisions only in a less absolute sense (Principle 
#3).  That is, for the reasons discussed below, “stare decisis isn’t a pro-
crustean bed” for higher courts (p. 156). 
To begin with, a higher court’s earlier decision might not be as prec-
edential as it initially seems.  There could be some give in the joints.  On 
that score, Principle #15 offers some practical advice to lawyers and 
judges who encounter a questionable precedent in a higher court.  Study 
the decision’s underlying authorities; doing so may reveal, for example, 
that the court was in fact focused on a narrower issue and had not in-
tended to speak more broadly to the issue now at hand (p. 157).  Scruti-
nize the extent of explanation offered; the absence of evidence that the 
earlier court had fully considered the issue diminishes the decision’s 
precedential value (p. 158).  Also assess whether the decision is a fledg-
ling or outlier decision that other courts haven’t followed (pp. 159–60); 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 Similarly, foreign courts in civil law systems are not bound by precedent, but the treatise 
observes that they have “moved toward common-law methods” over time (p. 17). 
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if so, the decision may occupy a “doctrinal no-man’s land” where the 
decision controls only in cases with identical facts, as is true with the 
Supreme Court’s major league baseball decision (p. 100). 
There is also the possibility that a higher court could overrule its 
own earlier decision.  The treatise’s discussion of when to depart from 
stare decisis turns on practical considerations, rather than grand theory.  
The authors list several reasons to consider for and against overruling a 
precedent (Principles #47 and #48).  Those reasons seem to boil down, 
the authors imply, to whether the decision has been acquiesced in and 
relied upon by the public (pp. 396, 404).26  For example, decisions that 
pertain to issues of procedure generally matter more prospectively and 
thus affect reliance interests less than, say, decisions involving property 
or contract rights (Principles #41 and #51).  A court might therefore have 
stronger ground to overrule a wrongly decided procedural decision than 
a decision on a matter of property law.  The authors also explain that 
stare decisis has more force with respect to decisions involving statutory 
interpretation, as opposed to constitutional decisions, because statutes 
can be amended more readily than constitutions in response to judicial 
decisions (Principles #38 and #40).  The treatise also identifies factors 
that should be irrelevant to this inquiry, including hardship in a partic-
ular case (Principle #49) and a change in the court’s personnel (Principle 
#50), and factors with uncertain relevance, such as whether the age of 
an older precedent is a ground for reconsidering it or preserving it (p. 
357).  
As a practical matter, no precedent will ever be overruled unless that 
issue is before the appropriate higher court.  That means the inquiry 
into when a higher court might overrule one of its earlier decisions must 
encompass the procedure by which that question gets before the court.  
In the context of the federal courts, for example, the treatise explores 
what makes an issue worthy of review by the Supreme Court (Principle 
#63) or a court of appeals sitting en banc (Principle #61).  Of course, the 
Supreme Court is interested in resolving lower court splits, and the 
courts of appeals are similarly attuned to policing intracircuit conflicts.  
But there’s also the more nebulous concept of whether a case presents a 
sufficiently “important” issue to merit review.  The treatise collects rele-
vant considerations on that front (pp. 498–505, 521–29). 
That covers the bedrock differences in weight among nonbinding 
precedents and those that are binding either in an absolute or looser 
sense.  In addition, the treatise furnishes an exhaustive catalog of 
“weight” factors that bear on whether a court might follow a nonbinding 
decision or depart from one of its own earlier decisions.  In some in-
stances, these factors might also indicate that an apparently strictly 
binding precedent is not in fact so.    
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 The treatise cites Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411, 414 (2010). 
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Some of the factors correspond to the precedent’s age and history.  A 
decision that other courts have repeatedly endorsed is entitled to more 
weight, whether the decision was a “leading” one that first definitively 
settled an important legal issue (Principle #17) or merely an “ancient” 
one that has been consistently followed (Principle #18).  Quite naturally, 
judicial and scholarly approval of a decision generally increases a pre-
cedent’s weight, whereas criticism lessens it (Principles #25 and #26).  If 
the decision is later overruled, it no longer has any weight, unless it 
remains binding on federal collateral review of a criminal judgment or 
because it would otherwise retroactively disturb vested rights (Principle 
#37).  The litigation history of the decision is relevant, too.  The absence 
of oral argument or full briefing may lessen a precedent’s weight (Prin-
ciple #23), as is true if the decision resulted from ex parte, preliminary, 
or interlocutory proceedings (Principle #24). 
The rank and reputation of the court that issued the decision may 
also matter.  Where a court sits within its judicial hierarchy generally 
corresponds with the precedential value of its decisions (Principles #27 
and #29).  And a court with a reputation for expertise in a particular 
subject matter is more likely to speak authoritatively on that subject, 
such as the Second Circuit on securities law or the D.C. Circuit on ad-
ministrative law (pp. 245–46).  The treatise suggests that the individual 
reputation of an authoring judge might similarly bear on the decision’s 
perceived persuasive value, at least with respect to judicial giants like 
Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand (Principle #28). 
Structural attributes of an opinion can affect a precedent’s weight as 
well.  For example, advisory opinions by state high courts are merely 
persuasive authority (Principle #32).27  Or consider a per curiam opinion 
that is not signed by an authoring judge.  Any lower court that is bound 
by a higher court’s decision will be equally bound by a per curiam opin-
ion.  For other courts, the per curiam opinion’s precedential value turns 
on the extent of its reasoning: A summary opinion is less precedential, 
whereas a reasoned opinion is treated the same as a signed opinion (Prin-
ciple #21).28  
Opinions differ not only in form but also in the level of support they 
receive from the court’s members, and this, too, should be taken into 
consideration when assessing a decision’s precedential value.  The more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 An exception to this general rule can be found in the constitutions of Colorado and South 
Dakota, where advisory opinions by the states’ high courts are binding on lower courts (p. 275). 
 28 This distinction is necessary, the treatise explains, in light of a change in the purposes of the 
per curiam form over time (pp. 215–17).  In earlier times, the form signaled that the result was 
obvious, in which case the opinion would be precedential regardless of whether the reasoning was 
spelled out by the court.  The form is still used to resolve easy cases, but it is now also used when 
members of the court agree as to a result but not on the reasoning.  It would thus be a mistake to 
afford full precedential value to a per curiam opinion unless it’s clear that at least a majority of the 
court agreed on one line of reasoning for reaching that result. 
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straightforward principles on this score are that unanimous opinions 
generally carry more weight than split decisions (Principle #19), and that 
equally divided decisions have no precedential value at all (Principle 
#22).  A trickier problem arises in the context of fragmented courts and 
resulting plurality opinions.  In the federal courts, under Marks v. 
United States,29 the holding in a fractured decision is the “position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.”30  Generally speaking, that means the narrowest common 
ground on which a majority of the concurring judges agreed, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, is controlling in future cases (Principle #20).  The 
treatise identifies several complications that arise with this rule in prac-
tice.  What if the concurrence offering the narrowest ground was not 
necessary for the majority because a majority could be formed from 
judges joining broader opinions (pp. 201–03)?  Or what happens when 
there is no common ground at all among concurring judges because they 
adopt distinct reasoning such that no analysis could be described as the 
“logical subset” of any other (p. 205)?31  If agreement on a point of law 
can be found only among concurring and dissenting judges who merely 
apply the legal principle to the facts differently, does that legal principle 
control in future cases (pp. 206–07)?  The treatise is a resource for track-
ing the disagreement in the federal courts on all of these questions.  
One final point about the treatise’s consideration of how far a pre-
cedent governs in a given case merits mentioning.  As we noted above, 
despite its title, the treatise occasionally considers nonjudicial prece-
dents.  In that vein, the treatise’s discussion of precedential weight en-
compasses the extent to which executive and legislative pronouncements 
might influence judicial decisionmaking (Principles #33 and #34).  There 
is a brief discussion of attorney general opinions as persuasive authority 
(pp. 277–85).  The treatise also sets out the basic doctrine of  
Chevron/Skidmore deference to agency interpretations of statutes, with-
out editorializing on the doctrine’s merit (pp. 285–89).  The treatise takes 
a slightly more skeptical position on the value of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation, for which it allows only “some weight” in 
doubtful cases (p. 290).32  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 30 Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 31 The treatise quotes United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 32 The treatise compares SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 3, at 369–90 (arguing 
against the use of legislative history), with ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 29–54 
(2014) (arguing that Justice Scalia and Professor Garner’s position “fail[s] to reflect the reality of the 
legislative process,” id. at 52). 
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* * * 
The treatise addresses one other major challenge of working with 
precedent that we have not yet covered: interpreting precedent.  Deter-
mining the meaning of an earlier decision combines both dimensions of 
the treatise’s inquiry into which precedents bind and how far.  That is, 
the extent to which an earlier decision is “on point” determines in large 
part whether the decision is precedent for a particular case and, if so, 
how much weight it should be afforded. 
We turn to the principles governing interpretation in the next Part, 
which expands our focus from the application of precedent to the front-
end process of writing precedent. 
II.  WRITING PRECEDENT 
The Law of Judicial Precedent treats the interpretation of precedent 
in its opening section, “The Nature and Authority of Judicial Prece-
dents.”  The principles governing interpretation describe modes of rea-
soning and are thus necessarily much less rule-like than many of the 
principles discussed above.  It is with respect to this section, therefore, 
that readers might be most skeptical of the viability of a codification 
effort.  The authors would likely agree — the blackletter principles they 
provide here are intended merely to provide general guidance.  The trea-
tise does so by breaking down the challenge of interpretation into dis-
crete components, which include identifying the holding of a case, sep-
arating holdings from dicta, determining the proper scope of any rule 
that can be extracted, and analogizing between the facts of cases. 
When it comes to interpretation, one of the treatise’s central insights 
is that the challenge belongs as much to the authoring court as it does 
to future readers.  The meaning of a decision turns on what the precise 
question before the court was, what governing rule was applied, what 
the relevant facts were, and how the rule was applied to those facts to 
answer the question.  An opinion’s future readers must decide those 
points for themselves.  But an authoring court can facilitate that process 
greatly by clarifying the scope and reasoning of its decision.  In short, 
although future courts get “the last word” on a decision’s meaning, what 
the authoring court writes is always the “starting point” (p. 73). 
Accordingly, the treatise’s dissection of the interpretation process 
raises the question of how difficulties in interpreting precedent can be 
avoided at the front end, when the precedent is written.  In other words, 
what lessons can authoring courts draw from the treatise?  We take up 
that question in this Part. 
Although we focus here on opinion writing solely from the perspec-
tive of providing better precedential guidance to future courts, we rec-
ognize that authoring courts have other objectives, too.  For example, a 
fundamental purpose of the judicial opinion is to explain the decision to 
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the parties.33  Opinions may also help educate the broader public about 
what courts are doing that is relevant to their lives.34  The characteristics 
that make opinions effective in these respects may coincide with those 
that make for effective precedent, but the overlap is not complete.35  We 
do not address here how judges should balance the different objectives 
they face.  We suggest only that the task of writing more effective pre-
cedent merits greater attention, and we propose ways that authoring 
courts can do so with the lessons of the treatise in mind.   
Turning to those lessons, we consider below the treatise’s implica-
tions for three key steps in the opinion-writing process: refining the ques-
tion presented, identifying the governing law, and describing the mate-
rial facts.  There is some artificiality to this breakdown, in that 
improvements in one dimension may naturally result in improvements 
in the others, but dividing up the discussion in this way helps to high-
light effective practices at a more granular level.  Our discussion on each 
score begins with the treatise’s insights from the perspective of inter-
preting precedent and then works backward from there to draw atten-
tion to better drafting practices for authoring courts. 
Our focus throughout is on avoiding unintentional lack of clarity.  In 
other words, how can authoring courts take more care to announce clear 
holdings, indicate the intended scope of their decisions, and so on?  We 
do not suggest that writing effective precedent means tying the hands of 
future courts as much as possible.  As we discuss in the section that 
concludes this Part, there may be good reasons to write narrowly rather 
than broadly or to be vague rather than definitive, so as to preserve 
flexibility for later courts.  We suggest some factors that may be useful 
for authoring courts deciding how much to resolve in a given case, but 
our primary argument is that courts should make any such choices in-
tentionally after considering the relevant tradeoffs. 
A.  Refining the Question Presented 
A clearly defined question presented lays the foundation for an ef-
fective precedent.  Usually it is easy enough to say at a high level of 
generality what a case is about.  Did a particular search violate the 
Fourth Amendment?  Is the contract at issue enforceable?  But it is also 
usually true that the court could take a variety of paths to resolve the 
case, and readers need to know which grounds the court relied on to 
understand how to apply the opinion as precedent.  By properly refining 
the question presented to identify the precise issue on which the case 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 22–24 (3d ed. 2012). 
 34 See Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1365–66 (1988). 
 35 For example, in seeking to justify a decision to the parties, a court might be inclined to address 
all the points raised in the briefs to show that they have been fully considered.  But that degree of 
detail is likely to make it harder for readers seeking to apply the case as precedent to grasp its “vital 
issues.”  Id. at 1363 (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 8a, at 245 (3d ed. 1940)). 
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turns, authoring courts can reduce confusion that later readers would 
have otherwise faced in the interpretation process. 
From the standpoint of later readers, knowing exactly what question 
the authoring court believed it was resolving is the first step to identify-
ing the holding of the case.  The treatise defines holdings as “the parts 
of a decision that focus on the legal questions actually presented to and 
decided by the court” (p. 44).  Identifying the holding is critical because 
only that aspect of the case constitutes formally binding precedent.  Ev-
erything else, including other statements of legal propositions, consti-
tutes dicta and does not bind future courts (p. 44).36 
When an opinion defines the question presented more loosely, it be-
comes more difficult for readers to “glean what the appellate court ac-
tually decided and determine which aspects of the appellate court’s writ-
ten opinion were necessary to its ultimate decision” (p. 53).  Perhaps the 
most basic problem occurs when the authoring court never pinpoints the 
legal question it is answering.  For example, a court that is considering 
overlapping constitutional and statutory challenges to a particular ac-
tion might not clearly identify which issue it is analyzing.  Likewise, a 
court analyzing a claim involving multiple elements or a multi-pronged 
framework may not be precise about the step at which it is deciding the 
case.  Future readers may then have difficulty determining what aspect 
of the legal framework or which doctrinal element the case serves as 
precedent for. 
Insufficient attention to the question presented can also create con-
fusion about the scope of the rule that can be extracted from the case.  
In other words, there may be uncertainty about how broadly or nar-
rowly to state the case’s holding.  How the authoring court itself states 
the holding is not dispositive, because the underlying reasoning may 
support a broader or narrower rule, and future courts get to determine 
for themselves what that reasoning was (p. 89). 
To illustrate the scope problem, the treatise gives the example of a 
hypothetical case in which the result is that “Sylvester, the testator’s cat, 
cannot inherit the $10,000 bequeathed to him” (p. 59).  The holding 
could be stated at various levels of generality.  A rule such as “cats can-
not inherit money under a will” (p. 59) is probably too narrow because 
whatever reasons the court would have given “for not allowing cats to 
inherit seem as if they should apply to other animals as well” (p. 59).  A 
better candidate would be that “animals cannot inherit money under a 
will” (p. 59) or perhaps that “animals cannot inherit any type of property 
under a will” (p. 60).  Conversely, one can imagine even broader rules — 
“that animals cannot own property, period,” or “that animals have no 
rights at all” — which would go too far because they “probably wouldn’t 
be supported by the court’s discussion” (p. 60). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 As we discuss in section D, dicta may be treated as authoritative — including to the point of 
being effectively binding, even if not formally so — under particular circumstances. 
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The point of the example is that, regardless of what the court pur-
ported to hold, the true holding of the case would depend on what rule 
the underlying logic supported.  Was the reasoning directed at cats or at 
all animals?  Was it directed at money or at any type of property?  Was 
it directed at the act of inheritance or at property ownership in general?  
The scope of the holding depends on the level of generality at which the 
court reasons.  It is ultimately up to future courts to make that determi-
nation, but authoring courts can reduce confusion about what they in-
tended to decide by refining the question presented to clarify the level 
of generality at which the facts will be analyzed. 
Related to the task of assessing scope is the problem of determining 
what reasoning in the opinion actually matters for reaching the result.  
This, of course, is the challenge of distinguishing the holding from dicta, 
and it too can be made harder when the court does not clearly identify 
the precise issue being decided.  When a court’s reasoning is cast at 
varying levels of generality and is difficult to decipher, the “true” holding 
of the case may be open to legitimate debate.  But a more precise state-
ment of the question presented at least helps readers discern what rea-
soning the court itself thought was necessary to its decision, as opposed 
to what it considered dicta.  And the authoring court’s own view of the 
holding is the starting point for interpretation, even if it’s not determi-
native (p. 73).37  
Consider the case of Toll v. Moreno,38 involving a public university’s 
policy of charging lower tuition for “in-state” students.  The Supreme 
Court began its opinion by stating: “The question in this case is whether 
the University’s in-state policy is invalid under the Supremacy Clause 
of the Constitution, insofar as the policy categorically denies in-state 
status to domiciled nonimmigrant aliens who hold G-4 visas.”39  (G-4 
visas are issued to employees of certain international organizations, like 
the World Bank, and their immediate family members.)  After summa-
rizing cases involving state discrimination on the basis of alienage, the 
Court concluded that the cases “stand for the broad principle that ‘state 
regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against  
aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes 
additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.’”40 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 At the very least, an interpreting court can have confidence that any reasoning the authoring 
court believed was necessary to decide the case will have been the product of considered judgment, 
rather than off-the-cuff musings.  That is significant because lower courts will often decide to follow 
the reasoned statements of higher courts even when those statements may be considered dicta.  See 
infra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 38 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 39 Id. at 3. 
 40 Id. at 12–13 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976)). 
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To discern whether the university’s tuition policy imposed “addi-
tional burdens not contemplated by Congress,” the Court next turned to 
two pertinent federal laws.  First, Congress had made this particular 
class of aliens eligible to establish domicile in the United States, yet the 
state was denying them a privilege afforded to others domiciled there.41  
Second, federal law granted G-4 aliens an exemption “from all taxes on 
their organizational salaries.”42  The Court concluded that “[b]y impos-
ing on those G-4 aliens who are domiciled in Maryland higher tuition 
and fees than are imposed on other domiciliaries of the State, the Uni-
versity’s policy frustrate[d]” the federal objective of using tax benefits to 
encourage the specified international organizations to base substantial 
operations in the United States.43 
In a dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist advanced a narrow reading of 
the case’s holding by contending that the Court had invalidated the uni-
versity’s tuition policy simply on the basis of a conflict between that 
policy and the two federal laws, and hence under a traditional preemp-
tion analysis.44  Thus, in his view, the broad suggestion that “any state 
law which discriminates against lawfully admitted aliens is void . . . if 
Congress did not contemplate such a law” was dictum.45  That reasoning 
was unnecessary to the result, he argued, because the Court found a 
“conflict with federal law, just as traditional pre-emption cases  
instruct.”46 
Our interest, setting aside the disagreement over the merits, is in the 
holding/dictum distinction.  The ambiguity in the Court’s opinion arises 
from the fact that its analysis at times appeared to apply a broader test 
under which any state regulation that discriminates on the basis of alien-
age is invalid if it imposes a “burden not contemplated by Congress,” 
but elsewhere appeared to follow a traditional preemption analysis by 
relying on a conflict between the university’s tuition policy and federal 
statutes.  The inconsistent lines of analysis make it difficult to discern a 
true holding, but a more precisely stated question presented would have 
at least clarified the Court’s intentions. 
The Court’s only statement of the question presented was the one 
quoted above, asking whether the university’s in-state policy violated 
the Supremacy Clause.  If the Court had instead specified more clearly 
that it sought to decide only whether a public university could permis-
sibly charge G-4 aliens a higher amount in tuition, that would have sug-
gested the Court did not view the broader “additional burdens” language 
as necessary to its decision (because the Court’s narrower application of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Id. at 14. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. at 16. 
 44 Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  However, because he found the conflict analysis “quite 
unconvincing,” he dissented.  Id.  
 45 Id. at 28. 
 46 Id. at 32. 
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traditional preemption principles would have sufficed to answer that 
question).  Alternatively, if the Court had stated that the question before 
it was whether a state may discriminate against lawfully admitted  
aliens, that would have suggested the Court understood its application 
of the “additional burdens” test to be necessary to the result.  Because 
the Court left unclear the specific question it was answering, it is not 
surprising that later courts and commentators have interpreted the 
case’s holding differently.47 
To sum up the discussion so far, a properly refined question pres-
ented can reduce confusion in several key dimensions of the interpreta-
tion process: identifying the particular legal question that was answered, 
understanding the intended scope of the rule that can be extracted from 
the case, and distinguishing between holding and dictum.  Beyond af-
firmatively identifying the question to be answered, it may also be help-
ful, as the opinion proceeds, for the court to remind the reader about 
what is not being decided.  Doing so helps not only to simplify the in-
terpretation process for readers, but also to discipline the authoring 
court.  Ideally, the inconsistent lines of reasoning in a case like Toll would 
be spotted at the drafting stage.  If the authoring court stays focused on 
the precise question it is answering, it will be more attuned to when it 
is venturing into dicta and may well decide that any such unnecessary 
statements should be excised before they have a chance to confuse  
readers.48 
By way of illustration, consider a case in which the court effectively 
narrowed the issues to be decided while bracketing others that were 
unnecessary to reach, thus leaving readers a clear sense of how the case 
could properly be applied as precedent.  In United States v. Gonsalves,49 
the court was asked to decide whether a warrantless search for drugs in 
a doctor’s office conducted under a state health administrator’s statu-
tory inspection authority was permitted as an administrative search un-
der the Fourth Amendment.50  The first objection of the defendant,  
Wallace Gonsalves, Jr., was that the actions taken by the administrator, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Some courts and commentators have cited the very language flagged as dictum by Justice 
Rehnquist as Toll’s holding.  See, e.g., LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 424 (5th Cir. 2005); Carlson 
v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2001); Elisha Barron, Recent Development, The Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 645 (2011); 
Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis 
to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1832 (2007); see also Developments in the 
Law — Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1417 (1983) (quoting 
this language as evidence that the Court expanded “the previous bases of preemption”).  Others 
have treated Toll as a traditional conflict preemption case.  See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 
945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1058, 1060 (D. Ariz. 2013), rev’d, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe v. St. 
Louis Cmty. Coll., No. ED 104574, 2017 WL 2950753, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App. July 11, 2017). 
 48 We discuss circumstances in which dicta may be useful in section D below. 
 49 435 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 50 Id. at 66–67. 
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Catherine Cordy, could not satisfy the threshold step for qualifying as 
an administrative search because “the medical profession should not be 
treated as a highly regulated enterprise.”51  The court rejected this ar-
gument by pointing to the “numerous, longstanding and pervasive” pro-
visions in state law pertaining to the “storage and dispensation” of 
drugs.52 
In the course of its analysis, the court helpfully underscored the level 
of generality at which it was addressing the facts: 
Our focus, therefore, is on the regulation of drugs . . . .    
  . . . . 
  Whether the practice of medicine in general meets this test is a different 
question that we need not decide.  Nor are we concerned on this appeal 
with patient records; Cordy’s search and seizure was solely directed to mis-
branded and adulterated drugs held at large in Gonsalves’ office.  Given 
the variations in fact patterns and the sensitivity of the subject area, there 
is good reason to keep our focus narrow and, for the time being, to let the 
law develop case by case.53 
This clarification was valuable because Gonsalves himself had framed 
his argument as concerning the “medical profession” in general.  A less 
careful court might have stated only the general question presented, 
leaving it to readers to figure out that its reasoning addressed only the 
regulation of drugs.  Or if it had included some reasoning that related 
to the medical profession in general, readers would then have faced dif-
ficulties in trying to distinguish dictum from holding.  The passage as 
written prevents that uncertainty. 
As the opinion proceeded, the court continued to identify and set 
aside issues that were not being addressed: 
  The other three conditions for an administrative search are that the 
scheme serve a substantial government interest, that administrative (war-
rantless) searches be “necessary,” and that the scheme impose alternative 
safeguards.  The first is obviously satisfied and the second is adequately 
covered by case law explaining the need for random and surprise inspec-
tions.  Gonsalves does not make a frontal attack on either of these two 
conditions.54 
These quick statements were helpful for clearing out the questions that 
did not require analysis and preventing any confusion about what doc-
trinal element the ensuing discussion would be covering. 
As the court turned to the third additional condition for an adminis-
trative search, it again helpfully reformulated the question to be an-
swered to avoid implying a more categorical rule than it intended to 
create.  Gonsalves had raised two separate but related concerns about 
administrative searches involving individualized suspicion: “Gonsalves’ 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Id. at 67. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. (citations omitted). 
 54 Id. at 68 (citations omitted). 
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other main attack on Cordy’s search and seizure of the vaccines stems 
from the fact that this search [1] was not random but grew out of a 
specific charge of misconduct and [2] was coordinated as to timing with 
the Attorney General’s search.”55  As to the second concern, the court 
explained: 
  Patently, the Attorney General did not use Cordy as a proxy to conduct 
his own warrantless search; the Attorney General secured a warrant and 
had probable cause.  That Cordy coordinated the timing of her search with 
law enforcement authorities, so that neither side tipped off Gonsalves by 
acting alone, was not an evasion of the limits on either of them.56 
Here again the court bracketed questions it was not deciding, this time 
underscoring how different facts not present in this case might have 
been more troubling.  Although there was some coordination between 
the Attorney General and Cordy, it was permissible to address the con-
cern that Gonsalves might have been tipped off if they had acted sepa-
rately.  Coordination alone was not problematic, but the court was care-
ful not to imply a more blanket ruling.  Crucially, by emphasizing that 
the record did not reflect an effort to allow the Attorney General to 
circumvent the warrant requirement, the court reserved the question 
whether coordination of that sort would have been more problematic.   
Having dealt with that concern, the court then distilled Gonsalves’s 
objections to the targeted nature of the search into a single remaining 
issue: “The question, then, is whether Cordy should be prevented from 
making a warrantless search because in this case it was not random and 
because she in fact had good cause to suppose a violation.”57  After con-
sidering some potentially conflicting out-of-circuit precedent, the court 
answered that question in the negative.58 
A less careful court might have addressed Gonsalves’s multifaceted 
argument in a more sweeping manner, neglecting to parse out the ques-
tions that could be reserved because the record in this case did not re-
quire their resolution.  But this court, by stating the question to be re-
solved so precisely, made clear that it was holding only that an 
administrative search is not rendered unlawful solely because it is tar-
geted as opposed to random.  Future courts addressing cases involving 
coordination as a means of circumvention, or other potential abuses of 
inspection authority, will be free to consider those questions on a clean 
slate. 
B.  Identifying the Governing Law 
In addition to homing in on the precise question or questions it seeks 
to answer, an authoring court must also consider how best to describe 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 68–69. 
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the governing law that applies to the issues at hand.  It would be un-
usual for a court to fail to cite any law.  The more likely problem is a 
discussion of legal sources and principles that obscures the key point 
doing most of the analytical work.  Lack of clarity on this dimension, 
even with a well-stated question presented, can lead to confusion for 
later readers who need to understand the rationale of a decision in order 
to extract the proper rule from the case. 
As the treatise explains, readers seeking to identify an opinion’s hold-
ing are interested in not just the outcome of the case at hand, but also 
the ratio decidendi, the Latin phrase that means “reason for deciding” 
(p. 46).  More specifically, the treatise identifies the following key com-
ponents of the ratio decidendi: “(1) it must be a ruling on a point of law; 
(2) it must be expressly or impliedly given by a judge; (3) it must relate 
to an issue raised in the litigation; and (4) it must be necessary as a 
justification for the decision reached” (p. 46).59  Although some distin-
guish between the holding and ratio decidendi, the treatise generally 
uses the former term to encompass the latter (p. 46), and we will do the 
same. 
An earlier section of the treatise explains that every opinion can be 
read as a syllogism consisting of a major premise, minor premise, and 
conclusion (p. 23).  The major premise generally states some proposition 
of law: “Under specified circumstances, the rights of certain parties are 
X and Y” (p. 23).  The minor premise makes an assertion about the 
present case: “In this particular case, the parties are of the kind contem-
plated by the rule in the major premise and the circumstances are as 
specified — all other facts being immaterial” (p. 23).  And the conclusion 
states what logically follows from the two premises: “The rights of the 
parties in this case are X and Y” (p. 23). 
With this model of syllogistic reasoning in mind, authoring courts 
can aid the interpretive process by clearly identifying the major premises 
of their underlying syllogisms.  There are at least two common ways 
that the major premise can be obscured.  First, courts sometimes overuse 
boilerplate, meaning the general propositions of law that effectively 
serve as truisms in a particular context and are reflexively repeated even 
when they are far removed from the actual issue in the case.60  Other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 The treatise cites John Bell, Precedent, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 923, 
923 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008). 
 60 By way of example, consider this passage from a Fourth Amendment case about whether 
there was probable cause to support a warrantless search of an automobile: 
Pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search 
a readily mobile vehicle without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that the 
vehicle contains evidence of a crime.  We define probable cause as “reasonable grounds 
for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.”  United 
States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990).  Probable cause exists when there is a 
“‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
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commentators have similarly criticized the unnecessary inclusion of boil-
erplate as “counterproductive.”61  The concern is that opinions can be-
come bloated with various types of “padding,”62 such as the “unembar-
rassed repetition of obvious propositions” or “long quotations from 
previous cases to demonstrate fidelity to precedent.”63  The potential 
danger of such “information overload”64 is that it will “make it more 
difficult for the writer as well as for the reader to come to grips with the 
essential questions.”65  In some instances, boilerplate may have the effect 
not just of obscuring the major premise, but of masking its absence.66  
Courts can avoid these concerns by resisting the temptation to include 
boilerplate principles and zeroing in on the law that “directly affect[s] 
the point at issue.”67 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
place.’”  United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  Determining whether probable cause existed at the time 
of the search is a “‘commonsense, practical question’ to be judged from the ‘totality-of-
the-circumstances.’”  Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).  In determining whether prob-
able cause exists, we may not look to events that occurred after the search or to the sub-
jective intent of the officers; instead, we look to the objective facts known to the officers 
at the time of the search. 
Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 61 Mikva, supra note 34, at 1361.   
 62 Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 
1441 (1995). 
 63 Id. at 1430.  Judge Posner suggests courts may do this to create an artificial “impression of 
great thoroughness,” id. at 1441, with the goal of “sweep[ing] the reader along to a confident con-
clusion,” id. at 1442. 
 64 Mikva, supra note 34, at 1363. 
 65 Posner, supra note 62, at 1446. 
 66 For an example, again see Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1998).  Immediately 
after the boilerplate passage quoted supra in note 60, the court shifted to its factual application:  
 We conclude that probable cause existed to search plaintiff’s readily mobile vehicle 
due to the facts known to the officers at the time.  Those facts were as follows: (1) an 
unoccupied expensive car was haphazardly parked at 12:40 a.m. in a high crime area; (2) 
the engine was running; (3) the headlights were on; (3) [sic] the doors were unlocked; (4) 
the radio was turned on; (5) stolen vehicles are frequently abandoned with their engines 
running because the ignitions have been tampered with during the theft process; (6) Green 
Hills Apartments was known to the officers as a dumping ground for stolen vehicles and 
an area from which they had recovered many stolen vehicles; (7) the Dodge Stealth is a 
frequently stolen vehicle; and (8) the unlocked and running car was parked only a few feet 
from a drug bust and within easy reach of any member of the crowd which gathered.  
Under these circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the Stealth may 
have been a stolen vehicle and, thus, enter the vehicle to determine whether it had been 
tampered with or to determine the identity of the owner.  
Id. at 1075.  When addressing fact-intensive issues like probable cause, more granular rules may 
not be possible.  Nonetheless, shifting so abruptly from generic, high-level principles to the facts 
and then a conclusion makes it difficult for readers to extract any precedential guidance from a 
case. 
 67 Mikva, supra note 34, at 1361 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Two Types of Judi-
cial Opinion, 60 ALBANY L.J. 76, 77 (1899), reprinted in APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 200 
(Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974)).  The treatise highlights a different problem with boilerplate principles 
that is perhaps even more troubling, though less directly relevant to our point.  When boilerplate is 
not merely cited but actually relied upon, and is divorced from the context in which the principle 
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A second way opinions can obscure the major premise is by provid-
ing lengthy reasoning without a clear analytical payoff.  This can take 
different forms depending on the type of reasoning being employed.  For 
example, when there is relatively little law on point, a court may discuss 
first principles68 or policy concerns69 that would follow if one or the 
other party prevailed, but never clearly articulate the contours of the 
new rule it is fashioning.  In other cases, when the resolution of the 
dispute turns primarily on the interpretation of precedent, the court af-
ter summarizing applicable authority may simply announce without fur-
ther explanation that the earlier decisions compel a particular outcome.  
Readers are then left to infer for themselves what the major premise 
buried in those case summaries is supposed to be. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Tom Doherty Associates v. Saban 
Entertainment, Inc.70 illustrates how confusion of the latter sort can be 
avoided.  There the court considered whether a publisher could satisfy 
the irreparable harm requirement to obtain injunctive relief after the 
defendant took its valuable book properties to other publishing houses.71  
The court summarized several cases, analogous because they involved 
the threatened inability to sell a particular product, that reached 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
at issue was developed, there may be unintended and problematic transformations of the original 
idea over time (pp. 92–93).  As the treatise explains, “[s]ome of the greatest errors of thinking have 
arisen from the mechanical, unreflective application of old formulations . . . to new situations that 
are sufficiently discrepant from the old so that the emphasis on likeness is misleading and the ne-
glect of differences leads to unfortunate or foolish consequences” (p. 93) (second alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 276 (1949)). 
 68 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is a famous example of this type.  In that case, 
the Court recognized an unenumerated privacy right based on the “penumbras” of “specific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 484.  The Court concluded that a state contraceptive prohibition 
impermissibly intruded upon the “zone of privacy” in a “marriage relationship,” but it gave little 
guidance as to how this right should be analyzed in future cases.  Id. at 485–86; see also David B. 
Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 328–53 (2000) (describing five distinct interpretations of Griswold). 
 69 For example, in International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 
821 (1994), the Court decided that coercive civil contempt sanctions should sometimes require the 
protections of criminal proceedings.  Id. at 833–34.  It identified specific reasons for treating the 
particular sanctions at issue in that case as criminal in nature: The fifty-two-million-dollar million 
fine was particularly serious, and the sanction, once imposed, could not be “purge[d],” in contrast 
to a traditional coercive civil contempt that the contemnor could negate by performing a simple, 
affirmative act.  Id. at 837.  Moreover, the underlying injunction was especially complex and thus 
“require[d] elaborate and reliable factfinding” to properly adjudicate.  Id. at 833–34.  But the Court, 
having decided that criminal proceedings were necessary, did not distill its concerns into an opera-
tional rule to provide guidance on when the civil/criminal line is crossed in contempt sanctions 
cases.  As a result, later courts drew inconsistent lessons from the decision.  At least some decided 
that criminal proceedings are needed based solely on the severity of the sanction, while others con-
cluded that criminal proceedings are not needed so long as there is at least an initial opportunity to 
purge the contempt.  See Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 
393, 396–99 (2000). 
 70 60 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 71 Id. at 29–32, 37. 
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opposite conclusions on irreparable harm.72  The court then offered the 
following “governing principle” to capture when harm would be 
considered irreparable: 
Where the availability of a product is essential to the life of the business or 
increases business of the plaintiff beyond sales of that product . . . the dam-
ages caused by loss of the product will be far more difficult to quantify than 
where sales of one of many products is the sole loss.  In such cases, injunc-
tive relief is appropriate.73 
The present case involved the loss of a significant opportunity, as op-
posed to existing sales, but the court concluded these were “analytically 
the same” because “loss of prospective goodwill” involves the same sort 
of unquantifiable harm.74 
By articulating the key principle to be distilled from the earlier cases, 
the court made it easier to reconstruct the opinion’s syllogism.  The ma-
jor premise was that the irreparable harm requirement is satisfied when 
“the damages caused by loss of the product” would be particularly dif-
ficult to quantify after it takes place.  The minor premise was that the 
loss of prospective goodwill in the present case involved such unquan-
tifiable harm.  (The extension of the preexisting rule to the present facts 
involved reasoning by analogy to the minor premises of past cases, 
which is the subject of the next section.)  Thus, the irreparable harm 
requirement was satisfied in this case. 
A less helpful decision might have summarized existing precedent 
and then simply declared that the present case was more like the ones 
in which irreparable harm was deemed satisfied than the ones in which 
it was not.  Readers would then have to determine for themselves what 
the salient features of those earlier cases were and why they were 
deemed to be similar in the relevant respects to the facts of Tom Doherty 
Associates.  In the absence of guidance, readers might extract a holding 
different from the one that the authoring court intended.  An authoring 
court can prevent these difficulties by synthesizing the analytical payoff 
of the precedents it has summarized, thereby ensuring that readers begin 
with the correct major premise as they work to reconstruct the case’s 
underlying syllogism. 
C.  Describing the Material Facts 
Once the authoring court has identified the governing law, the chal-
lenge is to apply the law to the facts of the case in a manner that will 
provide guidance to future courts deciding similar cases.  Of course, 
sometimes stating the rule tells you all you need to know.75  A rule 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 Id. at 37. 
 73 Id. at 38. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See CARDOZO, supra note 19, at 164 (“Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, 
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providing a strict ten-day deadline with no exceptions, for example, does 
not require illustration in a factual context to grasp.  But often merely 
knowing what a rule says in the abstract does not resolve a case because 
we need the particulars in order to give that rule meaning.76  For exam-
ple, the rule that a lawful congressional delegation of rulemaking au-
thority to an administrative agency must contain an “intelligible princi-
ple” to constrain the agency’s decisionmaking does not provide much 
guidance without offering some sense of what it means to be intellig-
ible.77  In such cases, courts examine how precedent has applied the rule 
to previous facts and then determine whether the new facts are analo-
gous.  Authoring courts can equip future courts to do this by explaining 
precisely which facts in the present case trigger the rule at issue, why 
they matter, and how they matter relative to each other. 
The need to reason by analogy increases to the extent that the gov-
erning law is structured more as a standard than as a firm rule.  Con-
sider a run-of-the-mill negligence case in which a defendant who fails to 
exercise reasonable care is liable for any resulting harm caused.  It’s not 
feasible to articulate the governing law more precisely in a way that 
would apply to all of the conduct constituting a lack of reasonable care 
(p. 81).  So it is left to authoring courts to fill in the various possible 
meanings of that standard across negligence cases by identifying a range 
of fact patterns that match.  Those decisions, in turn, serve as precedents 
to guide the resolution of future disputes that are factually similar.78  
Thus, in cases governed by standards stated at a high level of generality, 
the parties typically agree on the well-established governing law, and 
the dispute turns entirely on which side draws more persuasive analo-
gies to past cases. 
Reasoning by analogy is also important when the law is to be ex-
tended or adapted to a different context or new circumstances.  Author-
ing courts cannot predict the full field of future cases to which their 
reasoning may later be relevant.79  For example, a court could not craft 
a rule that takes into account technology that doesn’t yet exist, or antic-
ipate how its decision in a securities case might be relevant to antitrust 
law.  Nor would we want it to try to do so.  But when interpreting courts 
confront cases in which there is no precedent directly on point, we do 
not assume they are free to write on a blank slate (p. 105).  Rather, we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
a majority, I think, could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one.  The law 
and its application alike are plain.”). 
 76 See id. (“In another and considerable percentage [of cases], the rule of law is certain, and the 
application alone doubtful.”). 
 77 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 463 (2001) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns 
v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 78 Over time, the treatise explains, narrower rules may emerge even if they are not stated ex-
plicitly, as “some generic fact situations may occur so often that they provide a good working sense 
of the law” (p. 81). 
 79 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 893–99 (2006). 
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expect them to reason by analogy, following the bedrock principle that 
“[l]ike cases should be decided alike” (p. 21).  Clarity in the authoring 
court’s factual discussion facilitates that analogical reasoning process. 
To put this discussion in the treatise’s terms: If the governing law 
constitutes the major premise of the syllogism, the application of the law 
to the facts of the case is the minor premise by which we can reason 
from the major premise to a conclusion.  Recall from our discussion of 
the governing law above that the major premise of a case provides for 
a particular result if “specified circumstances” exist (p. 23).  The minor 
premise is the court’s assertion of whether those circumstances exist in 
a particular case (p. 23). 
For a more concrete example, consider the following major premise 
from the negligence case: A defendant who fails to exercise reasonable 
care is liable for any resulting harm caused.  A minor premise in the 
case might be: The defendant in this particular case failed to exercise 
reasonable care because of facts A, B, and C.  That is, A, B, and C are 
the facts in the case that constitute one of the specified circumstances (a 
lack of reasonable care) contemplated by the major premise (p. 97).  A 
future court can then analogize between that case and a later case by 
determining that the facts A, B, and C in the precedent are sufficiently 
similar to facts in the later case for the same result to be reached  
(Principle #9).80     
The challenge for the authoring court, then, is to articulate the minor 
premise by explicitly describing which facts matter for the court’s ap-
plication of the governing law and, just as important, why.  By doing 
so, the authoring court is able to refine for future courts what it consid-
ers to be the “specified circumstances” contemplated by the governing 
law (p. 23). 
The most basic step the authoring court can take on that score is to 
clarify which facts fall within the major premise’s specified circum-
stances — that is, what A, B, and C are.  But an authoring court can 
provide greater guidance by also indicating why and how those facts 
matter.  As an illustration of this point, consider an example from the 
personal jurisdiction context. 
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,81 the Supreme Court 
applied the recently established “minimum contacts” test to a suit in 
which the defendant insurance company’s only contact with the forum 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 Or a future court could identify a material fact, D, in the precedent that is not present in the 
later case.  It may then distinguish the precedent by recharacterizing the precedent’s minor premise 
as: The defendant in that particular case failed to exercise reasonable care because of A, B, C, and 
D (Principle #8).  As we noted above and will explore further below, later courts have the final say 
in interpreting a precedent’s meaning, but the choices made by authoring courts guide that  
interpretation. 
 81 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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state of California was the single policy at issue in the case.82  After 
citing some general principles and a recent trend toward expanding the 
scope of personal jurisdiction, the Court concluded: 
[W]e think it apparent that the Due Process Clause did not preclude the 
California court from entering a judgment binding on respondent.  It is 
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract 
which had substantial connection with that State.  The contract was deliv-
ered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured 
was a resident of that State when he died.83 
Such a summary in the analysis phase of the opinion at least makes clear 
which facts mattered; earlier-recited background facts that were not re-
iterated were presumably not relevant to the analysis.  But in simply 
restating a string of facts, the Court provided no guidance on whether 
all of those facts were needed to reach its conclusion, whether any might 
have been independently sufficient, or whether some were more im-
portant than others.  Nor did the McGee Court explain why each of the 
restated facts was legally significant — how they contributed to creating 
a “substantial connection” with California — so that readers could better 
understand how to distinguish from or analogize to the case in a future 
dispute involving similar but not identical facts.  Those questions fell 
entirely to later courts to answer. 
As it turned out, the Supreme Court itself took up those issues later 
that same Term in Hanson v. Denckla.84  There the Court faced a similar 
scenario in which the defendants had no contact with the forum state of 
Florida except a single contract — in this instance a trust agreement — 
that was the basis of the dispute.85  In examining whether the outcome 
was controlled by McGee, the Court characterized the earlier case as 
having involved two key facts: the solicitation of a California resident 
for the agreement at issue and the mailing of insurance premiums from 
that state until the insured had died.86  The Court then explained why 
the absence of anything analogous to the first of those two facts made 
this case distinguishable from McGee: 
[T]his action involves the validity of an agreement that was entered without 
any connection with the forum State.  The agreement was executed in  
Delaware by a trust company incorporated in that State and a settlor dom-
iciled in Pennsylvania.  The first relationship Florida had to the agreement 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 82 Id. at 222. 
 83 Id. at 223 (citations omitted).  The Court also went on to address California’s “manifest in-
terest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay 
claims.”  Id.  This relates to what would later become the reasonableness prong of personal juris-
diction analysis, and not to minimum contacts.  We omit it here to keep the illustration relatively 
simple. 
 84 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 85 Id. at 251–52. 
 86 Id.  
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was years later when the settlor became domiciled there, and the trustee 
remitted the trust income to her in that State.  From Florida Mrs. Donner 
carried on several bits of trust administration that may be compared to the 
mailing of premiums in McGee.  But the record discloses no instance in 
which the trustee performed any acts in Florida that bear the same relation-
ship to the agreement as the solicitation in McGee.  Consequently, this suit 
cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege 
the defendant exercised in Florida.87 
Because McGee left unclear the relative significance of the facts high-
lighted in its analysis and why they mattered, the Hanson Court had 
substantial discretion on these points.  The Court decided that the initial 
solicitation, as opposed to any ongoing administrative communication, 
was the true linchpin. 
The Hanson Court then went on to explain why solicitation should 
be the key fact in cases of this type: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonres-
ident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
State.  The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of 
the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.88 
Thus, to help explain why the absence of solicitation was significant, 
Hanson created an important distinction between purposeful contact by 
the defendant and fortuitous contact based on the unilateral activity of 
other actors.  This elaborated rationale not only helps future readers 
understand how to apply Hanson to factually similar cases involving 
contracts, but also facilitates analogical reasoning between Hanson and 
other cases involving borderline contacts with the forum.89 
None of this discussion about the importance of clarifying the case’s 
operative facts is meant to suggest that authoring courts should avoid 
including additional facts for context.  Opinions almost always include 
more facts than are needed to resolve the case, and that is not necessarily 
a problem.  For example, contextual facts help authoring courts recount 
cases as stories, and a story is often more compelling to readers because 
it makes it easier for them to view the problems in the case from the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 Id. at 252 (footnote omitted). 
 88 Id. at 253. 
 89 Over time, the concept of purposeful availment was invoked more broadly and eventually 
became its own gloss on the “minimum contacts” test.  Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court determined that a car dealer and distributor were not 
subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 295, because the car they sold in New York 
reached Oklahoma through the unilateral activity of the buyer, id. at 298.  The situation there was 
very different, but the analogy to Hanson is that the sellers, like the trustee in Hanson, never en-
gaged in purposeful contact with the forum state.  Id.  
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perspectives of the litigants.90  Difficulties arise only when it becomes 
unclear which facts are actually driving the court’s reasoning and why 
they are significant (pp. 80–81).  In most cases, the court will recite facts 
initially in a background section and reiterate the ones that really matter 
later in the discussion.  But when the facts are simply restated without 
analysis and followed by a legal conclusion, readers are left to divine on 
their own why those facts fall within the specified circumstances con-
templated by the governing law.91 
D.  Deciding How Much to Resolve 
Our focus in the preceding sections was on clarity: how an authoring 
court can reduce confusion about the precise question it’s answering, 
the rule it’s creating or extracting from preexisting authorities, and the 
specific facts it’s relying on to reason from that rule to an answer to the 
question.  At each step, though, the authoring court must first make a 
choice about how much it wants to resolve and how much it wants to 
reserve for future courts.92 
In identifying the precise question to be answered, for example, the 
court can frame the issue at different levels of generality.  In the 
Gonsalves case discussed above, the court opted to analyze whether the 
drug industry specifically was “highly regulated,”93 but it could have 
addressed that issue with respect to the medical profession more  
generally. 
Likewise, when identifying the governing law, the court has discre-
tion about how strictly or loosely it chooses to articulate the rule it is 
creating or extracting from preexisting authorities.  In Tom Doherty As-
sociates, the court was able to synthesize a fairly granular rule across 
cases for what constituted irreparable harm,94 but in other settings a 
court might prefer to identify only a more general principle and to let 
future courts refine the rule as it’s applied to additional sets of facts.95 
Finally, when deciding how much to say about material facts, the 
court has discretion about how definitive it wants to be in determining 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 90 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477, 1516–17 (1995). 
 91 For an additional example of the recitation of facts without much analysis, see supra note 66. 
 92 On the nature of this problem with respect to the levels of generality at which courts charac-
terize constitutional rights, see generally Michael Coenen, Characterizing Constitutional Inputs, 67 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018); and Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in 
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). 
 93 United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 94 Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37–39 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 95 We previously identified Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as an example of a 
case in which no clear rule was articulated.  See supra note 68.  Given the relative novelty of the 
privacy right at issue, the Court’s vague pronouncement in that case may have been prudent. 
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which facts matter and why.96  In McGee, the Court opted not to say 
whether the three key facts establishing minimum contacts with the fo-
rum state were independently sufficient or whether all were necessary 
to satisfy due process.  Although that choice engendered uncertainty for 
readers, an authoring court might sometimes deliberately choose such a 
cautious approach to allow future courts to determine which facts in the 
case should be considered critical and for what reasons.97 
As an initial matter, it’s worth observing that a court does not pitch 
the breadth of its decision on a blank slate.  Far from it.  The authoring 
court may decide only the legal questions actually presented to it (Prin-
ciple #4).  The federal courts, for example, are limited by Article III of 
the Constitution to resolving actual cases and controversies.98  Issues 
not actually presented by the case are left to future courts to resolve on 
another day.  In this way, each judicial decision is only one small part 
of a much larger process in which the underlying legal problem is refined 
and resolved by different courts over time.  No authoring court need 
think that its job is to solve the problem once and for all. 
At the same time, as the examples above indicate, decisions about 
the scope of the questions presented and how broadly to describe the 
rules and facts in answering them are inescapable in writing opinions.  
If authoring courts simply wrote every opinion as narrowly as possible, 
each opinion would be limited to its precise facts and thus offer very 
little precedential guidance to future litigants and courts (p. 59).99 
In considering whether to resolve more or less in a given case, au-
thoring courts may find it helpful to think about their role in the larger 
collective project we highlighted earlier.100  That perspective leads to 
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 96 Resolving less at this step might often look the same as a lack of clarity.  In other words, a 
court that chooses not to say exactly which facts matter is also providing less guidance to future 
readers seeking to analogize to or distinguish from the case.  To minimize confusion, authoring 
courts should be explicit about their choice to leave a question open: If a court is not prepared to 
say whether two key facts are both necessary to the outcome of the case, it should simply say so.  
See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2346 (2014) (“Although the threat of 
Commission proceedings is a substantial one, we need not decide whether that threat standing alone 
gives rise to an Article III injury.  The burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed by 
the additional threat of criminal prosecution.  We conclude that the combination of those two threats 
suffices to create an Article III injury under the circumstances of this case.” (emphasis added)).  
 97 Justice Black, the author of the majority opinion in McGee, see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957), dissented in Hanson, which suggests that he might have chosen to provide 
greater guidance in McGee if he had anticipated how it would later be interpreted, see Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256–58 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 98 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 99 As others have observed, the articulation of general rules also promotes the rule of law by 
showing that courts are deciding cases based on neutral principles rather than on an ad hoc basis.  
See Scalia, supra note 14, at 1177–79; Waldron, supra note 5, at 20 (“This, I believe, is a primary 
obligation that [a judge] has under the rule of law — to derive her particular decisions from an 
identified and articulated general norm.”).  
 100 See supra p. 549.  
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approaching questions of scope by asking what would be most useful to 
later courts (and the litigants before them) in the process of developing 
the law.  If an authoring court lacks confidence that it has clear guidance 
to offer future courts, writing more narrowly will avoid leading future 
courts astray while preserving flexibility for them.101  Indeed, because a 
court often cannot foresee how a broader ruling will impact the full field 
of future cases to which the rule will apply,102 there is much virtue in 
restraint.  But at times there may be good reason to depart from a strict 
minimalist approach when an authoring court can provide clear guid-
ance to future courts on a legal issue that has been litigated by the par-
ties and fully considered by the court.  However an authoring court re-
solves this question in a given case, the court should be intentional about 
its decision and recognize what is at stake in the tradeoff. 
At first glance, one might object that it doesn’t really matter how the 
authoring court frames its decision because “the later court always gets 
the last word” (p. 73).  True, as we emphasized earlier,103 the authoring 
court’s words will serve as the starting point.  But later courts will ulti-
mately decide for themselves how to interpret and apply a precedent.  A 
later court may determine, for example, that certain propositions in an 
opinion were dicta and therefore not binding, or that a broadly stated 
principle should be read in light of the narrow factual context actually 
before the court (which means, in effect, that any broader implications 
are treated as dicta) (pp. 102–03).104 
But even while emphasizing the second court’s final say in the pro-
cess, the treatise makes clear that broad statements and dicta have a 
significant role to play in developing the law.  That is particularly true 
of judicial dicta — meaning statements that were not strictly necessary 
to the result but were the product of apparent consideration105 — as 
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 101 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).  Incremental decisionmak-
ing also captures accumulated input from a broader set of judges with different backgrounds and 
experiences, which often results in better decisions.  See id. at 3–23.  
 102 See Schauer, supra note 79, at 893–99. 
 103 See supra p. 557. 
 104 For example, the Supreme Court recently invalidated the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 704 (2006), which prohibits the making of false statements about military honors.  See United 
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012).  Although earlier cases had broadly suggested that false 
statements were not entitled to First Amendment protection, those cases all involved “defamation, 
fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion 
of privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation.”  Id. at 719.  None of the cases “confronted a measure, 
like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.”  Id.  Thus, the Court interpreted 
the earlier statements within their factual contexts and treated their more categorical implications 
as dicta (pp. 56–57). 
 105 The treatise defines judicial dictum as “an opinion by a court on a question that is directly 
involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is not essential 
to the decision and therefore not binding even if it may later be accorded some weight” (p. 62) 
(quoting Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20).  
  
576 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:543 
opposed to obiter dicta, which are “peripheral, off-the-cuff judicial re-
mark[s]” (p. 62).  Lower courts generally treat the judicial dicta of higher 
courts as entitled to substantial weight, up to and including treating 
them as effectively binding (pp. 69–70).  Some circuit courts do the same 
for judicial dicta in their own decisions (pp. 63–64), and even those 
courts that don’t would likely afford such statements persuasive value 
(pp. 64–65).  Thus, when an authoring court resolves more than it needs 
to, the impact on future courts might be good (useful guidance) or bad 
(confusion or rigidity), but the choice is not without consequence.106 
More concretely, there are several factors that a court might consider 
in choosing whether to resolve more or less in a given case.  Our focus 
is on factors that relate to the courts’ shared project of developing the 
law, in which future courts and the litigants before them might benefit 
from either greater guidance or greater flexibility depending on the  
circumstances.107 
A primary consideration is where the authoring court sits within the 
judicial hierarchy.  Higher courts are called upon to provide greater 
guidance than lower courts.  Appellate courts expending resources on a 
precedential opinion seek to provide guidance to a greater number of 
litigants and lower courts in order to justify the use of limited judicial 
resources in deciding those cases.108  That consideration is especially 
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 106 The treatise suggests that obiter dicta are “seldom considered precedential,” though they are 
“sometimes persuasive” (p. 62).  But even obiter dicta of a higher court may be difficult to ignore in 
practice, since the line between obiter and judicial dicta is no less vexing than the line between 
holding and dictum.  For example, the Supreme Court’s suggestions prior to Alvarez that false 
statements are categorically not entitled to constitutional protection arguably fell closer to the obiter 
dicta side of the spectrum, given that the Court probably did not fully consider the value of false 
speech as a distinct category when it addressed the more specific issues of defamation, fraud, and 
the like.  See supra note 104.  But that did not stop lower court judges and litigants from taking 
those suggestions seriously (pp. 56–57).  See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1219 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (noting the “clarity and consistency of the Supreme Court’s insistence 
that false statements of fact . . . generally fall outside First Amendment protection”), aff’d, 567 U.S. 
709 (2012).  Given the potential for sowing confusion and unwittingly tying the hands of future 
courts, authoring courts should identify the dicta in their own decisions at the drafting stage and 
give careful consideration to whether they should be included.  See supra text accompanying note 
48. 
 107 Of course, other factors affect the breadth of a court’s decision.  In particular, precedential 
decisions are usually issued by multimember courts, which means that the realities of disagreement 
and the need for compromise can affect the breadth of a decision.  For example, members of a panel 
might think different facts matter to the outcome and compromise by drafting an opinion that 
includes all of them.  Or a panel might describe a legal standard at a high level of generality only 
because the judges can’t agree on what that standard would require more concretely.  
 108 In many oral arguments before appellate courts, advocates will resist responding to a hypo-
thetical because (as the judges well know) “that is not this case.”  But the appellate court often is 
not interested in simply declaring a winner based on the particular facts of the present case.  The 
purpose of the hypothetical is to help the court fashion a more generally applicable rule.  For a 
recent exchange along these lines, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–11, Hernandez v. Mesa, 
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118). 
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true with respect to the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts 
with discretionary jurisdiction, given that they generally take cases for 
the express purpose of clarifying the law.  Against the preference to pro-
vide as much guidance as possible, however, a higher court must weigh 
the benefits of restraint, such as letting the legal issue percolate in the 
lower courts, where litigants and judges may further refine the issue and 
test competing approaches to resolving it. 
This tradeoff was openly debated by the Supreme Court last Term 
in Maslenjak v. United States.109  At issue in the case was a federal 
statute that makes it a crime to knowingly procure naturalization 
through unlawful conduct.110  The immediate question before the Court 
was whether the unlawful conduct (in this case, lying in a naturalization 
application) must have contributed to the government’s decision to 
grant naturalization in order for criminal liability to attach.111  The 
Court held that it must.112  Because the district court in the petitioner’s 
criminal case had instructed the jury otherwise, the opinion could have 
ended there.113  But what the Court described as an “operational” ques-
tion remained: How should the causal influence requirement apply in 
practice?114 
The majority decided it was worth providing “further guidance” to 
future prosecutors, defendants, and district courts because it determined 
that it was “well-positioned” to do so.115  The parties had fully briefed 
what causal standard should apply, and the issue had already percolated 
in (and befuddled) the lower courts, one of which called the “Court’s 
failure to provide clear guidance ‘maddening[].’”116  The Court therefore 
went on to hold that the causal standard was an objective one (would 
the lie have affected how a “reasonable government official” applied the 
naturalization law?117), and that lies about facts that would disqualify 
the applicant from naturalization or “throw investigators off a trail lead-
ing to disqualifying facts” would satisfy the standard.118 
However, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote sepa-
rately to say that he would have stopped after resolving the immediate 
question whether or not a causal requirement applied.119  In their view, 
it would have been better to let the operational question percolate longer 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
 110 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012). 
 111 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923–24. 
 112 Id. at 1924. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1927. 
 115 Id. at 1927 n.4. 
 116 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 117 Id. at 1928.  
 118 Id. at 1929. 
 119 Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
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in the lower courts, where the issue’s resolution could benefit from “the 
crucible of adversarial testing” and “the experience of our thoughtful 
colleagues on the district and circuit benches.”120  
A second consideration is the state of the law at the time of the au-
thoring court’s decision.  For example, the existing caselaw around an 
issue may be extensive yet disconnected or not rationalized, such that 
there are various piecemeal rules, but no general rule.  The authoring 
court might decide that the time has come to synthesize across the cases 
to offer greater guidance with a more general rule.  A well-known ex-
ample of such synthesis is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,121 a New 
York products liability case in which Buick negligently manufactured a 
car that injured the plaintiff when one of its wooden wheels suddenly 
“crumbled into fragments.”122  Before MacPherson, New York common 
law required a plaintiff to be in contractual privity with the manufac-
turer to recover in such suits, but that requirement was not met in  
MacPherson because the plaintiff had purchased the car from a dealer, 
not the manufacturer.123  However, the privity requirement did not ap-
ply with respect to “inherently dangerous” products, and over time 
courts had separately declared that scaffolding, a building, an elevator, 
a rope, bottles of aerated water, and even a coffee urn were inherently 
dangerous.124  In MacPherson, Judge Benjamin Cardozo recognized 
that the lower courts had essentially gravitated to a new rule altogether, 
which he announced in the court’s decision: There was no privity re-
quirement; a manufacturer could be held liable for anyone foreseeably 
hurt by its negligence.125  
Conversely, when there is little or no caselaw in an area, a court 
might decide to write narrowly (or loosely) to permit later courts to de-
velop the contours of the law more gradually after different theories are 
developed and tested in future cases.126  After all, before the time was 
ripe for Judge Cardozo to synthesize across products liability cases and 
hold that there was no privity requirement, courts first issued incremen-
tal decisions that explored and pushed the boundaries of the “inherently 
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 120 Id.  
 121 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  
 122 Id. at 1051. 
 123 Id. 
 124 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 80–82 (2010); see also MacPherson, 111 
N.E. at 1052. 
 125 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052; STRAUSS, supra note 124, at 80–85. 
 126 Alternatively, in some circumstances the absence of controlling law may in fact spur a court 
to create a broader framework to provide needed guidance.  See, e.g., Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 
1034, 1039–45 (9th Cir. 2010) (engaging in detailed analysis of how the REAL ID Act guides review 
of adverse credibility determinations “[i]n light of the sparsity of Ninth Circuit precedent construing 
the REAL ID Act in this context,” id. at 1040). 
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dangerous” exception, thereby gradually eroding the privity require-
ment.  Those decisions issued narrow holdings that applied only to the 
products at issue in the cases, such as a scaffold of a certain height127 or 
a coffee urn that was steam driven.128     
Finally, the authoring court might consider the state of its knowledge 
about present and future factual circumstances to which its ruling might 
apply.  For example, in a case dealing with nascent technology, the au-
thoring court might be reluctant to speak broadly when it is still unclear 
what that technology’s (or its next generation’s) capabilities will ulti-
mately be, how widely it will be adopted, and so on.  In United States 
v. Knotts,129 the Supreme Court held that the use of a beeper to track a 
criminal suspect’s car wasn’t a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment because the suspect lacked a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his car’s movement on public streets.130  But the Court 
carefully reserved judgment on whether the result would change if the 
surveillance had occurred twenty-four hours a day in a “dragnet” fash-
ion, rather than in a more limited manner.131  As a result, the Court 
believed that it was not constrained by Knotts when it later confronted 
a case involving more intrusive GPS surveillance of a suspect’s car, 
which it held to be a search.132 
As the above considerations and examples show, there will rarely be 
a single, obviously correct answer as to how narrowly or broadly an 
authoring court should pitch its opinion in a given case.  Saying more 
might be helpful if doing so will provide clearer guidance to future 
courts; saying less might be appropriate because it preserves flexibility 
for future courts without running the risk of leading them astray.  The 
most we can ask of authoring courts is that they make the choice delib-
erately, aware of its impact on future courts and on the overall process 
of developing the law through precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Law of Judicial Precedent is the most comprehensive and au-
thoritative text to date on the application and authority of judicial prec-
edent in American courts.  We hope we’ve illuminated how the treatise 
might be useful for its intended audience of practicing lawyers and 
judges.  Most immediately, the treatise is an invaluable resource for 
identifying the principles that govern which precedents apply in which 
courts and what weight those precedents merit.  The treatise also puts 
the challenge of interpreting precedent into sharp relief — a challenge 
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 127 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 478 (N.Y. 1882). 
 128 Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064 (N.Y. 1909). 
 129 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 130 Id. at 281–82.  
 131 Id. at 283–84. 
 132 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–09 (2012). 
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that belongs as much to the authors of judicial decisions as to their read-
ers.  With that in mind, authoring courts can craft more effective prec-
edent by focusing more deliberately on the treatise’s insights into the 
reader’s interpretive task.   
 
 
